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This paper discusses actual and possible achievements and failures of Codland and examines 
it from the point of view of efficiency and in terms of distribution. It is argued in favour of the 
joint analysis of the two approaches when contemplating fisheries management reforms, since 
such reforms may create both winners and losers. The analysis demonstrates how rent drain 
from fishing communities and countries may occur despite significant resource rent creation. 
The change of the Codland economy is illustrated and compared to that of actual countries 
and to resource economic theory. It is concluded that if distributional and equity objectives 
matter, other instruments than ITQs, such as conditional tradable fish quotas and vessel 
licenses, resource taxes, co-management, public ownership, auctions, leases, time limited 
rights, time and area regulations, territorial user rights (TURFs) and marine protected areas 
(MPAs), should also be used. 
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Once upon a time there was a fish-resource-rich island nation in the midst of the ocean that 
wanted to improve its fisheries management system. We will name this imaginary nation, 
with its remote location and surrounded by water, Codland, so-called after the large, dominant 
and valuable fish in its seas. This paper discusses actual and possible achievements and 
failures of Codland and examines it from the point of view of efficiency and in terms of 
distribution. We will argue in favour of the joint analysis of the two approaches when 
contemplating fisheries management reform. Such reforms may create both winners and 
losers and the danger of rent drain from fishing communities and countries should not be 
ignored. 
 
Historically, like its distant neighbours, the Codland fisheries offered open access to both 
domestic and foreign fishing vessels. However, based on the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982 and enacted in 1994, a 200 nautical mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was established some years ahead of the new fisheries 
management discussion. The ecosystem in this part of the ocean was dominated by one 
species of fish, which had commercial importance. Of course, there were other living 
creatures on lower tropical levels, serving as prey for the commercial fish stock, but these 
were not technically or commercially viable so they are left out of this analysis.  
 
Shortly after the establishment of the EEZ and as the foreign fleets withdrew, the Codland 
fishing industry experienced a gradual improvement in the fish stock and in the economic 
performance of vessels and the associated processing industry. Since nature varies somewhat 
from year to year, this also affects the economic performance of the fishing industry; in leaner 
times, less fishing effort is attracted to the sea than in better times. As long as the entry into, 
and the exit from, fish harvesting is free, the opportunity costs of labour and capital in other 
parts of the economy is determined partly by the earnings in the fishing industry. However, 
even within such fisheries, some highliner fisheries are more effective than others and make a 
better living than the marginal fisheries. The Codland people wanted to increase their average 
earnings as well as their resource base – the fish stock. For this purpose it was necessary to 






Policy objectives and instruments 
 
The fisheries management scientists and economists of Codland were aware that management 
objectives, discussed globally, comprised economic, environmental and social sustainability. 
There were several sub-objectives, such as healthy fish stocks, high yields of fish, minimal 
discards, an economically-viable fishing industry, high resource rent, employment, good 
working conditions and fair/equal distribution of resource rents. They also knew that 
Pigouvian taxes, limited entry licensing and individual quota allocations, were among the 
main types of management instruments discussed in the literature, in addition to technical 
regulations of vessels and fishing-gear, as well as seasonal and area closures of fishing 
activities. Globally, all these types of instruments are in use in fisheries management, though 
it seems that resource rentals and resource taxes are used less than technical regulations, 
vessel licenses and fish harvest quotas (OECD, 2006). However, in recreational fisheries, both 
public and private resource owners seem to prefer monetary instruments to quantitative 
restrictions (Aas, 2008). 
 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) rules 
 
Having discussed these alternatives, the Parliament of Codland stated in the Constitution, 
paragraph ten, that “The fish resources within the country’s EEZ belong to the people of 
Codland in common” and it appointed the Institute of Fisheries Research to recommend the 
annual total allowable catch (TAC) to be shared among the fishing agents. But how to share? 
There were many proposals, including the following three. First, The Union of Coastal 
Fishermen suggested that the annual TAC should be dived into equal shares – one for each 
fisherman – and be made to be transferable within the quota year. Second, the Association of 
Pensioners recommended that TACs should be initially allocated equally to all people 
between the ages of 65 and 75 years. Through sales, this money would be added to their 
pensions. However, the Government preferred a proposal from the Union of Vessel Owners 
(UVO), and decided to allocate free, permanent shares to UVO members, in proportion to 
their track records. Only the biggest fishing companies were members of the UVO. 
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The permanent shares were made divisible and tradable and were named ITQs, which could 
be used as collateral and could be mortgaged. The UVO was proud and thrilled about their 
achievements, especially as they got the ITQs for free1. To monitor the development in the 
value of the ITQs, they were introduced and traded on the Capital Stock Exchange (CSE). The 
Parliamentary opposition were partly sceptical about these arrangements but some additional 
Members of Parliament (MPs) decided to support the New Fisheries Management Law, 
provided vessel- and ITQ-ownership were strictly confined to nationals of Codland. The few 
people who feared the creation of a new upper class of sea lords in this egalitarian nation were 
considered ridiculous. Aristocracy living from rich agriculture land was unknown in 
Codland’s fisheries based economy and few MPs and other people could imagine the rise of a 
fisheries based lordly class. Most of the MPs had attended a course in fisheries economics at 
the highly respected University College of Fisheries Economics (UCFE) and learned that the 
initial allocation of individual quotas would not matter for the efficiency of the system, as 
long as quotas were clearly defined and tradable – this is based on the ideas of the 1991 Nobel 
Laureate in economics; see Coase, 1960. However, more critical literature, such as Copes, 
1986, was not on the reading list at this college. Critical issues such as quota busting, discard, 
data fouling and equitable distribution were not on the agenda. 
 
At the outset, the initial allocation was limited to a few big fishing companies, the UVO 
members, all traded on the Stock Exchange, to avoid creating a governmental office to handle 
quota distribution; these companies were enabled to sell or lease quotas to other companies 
and fishermen. This was accepted; thus there was a Parliamentary majority for enacting the 
new and revolutionary ITQ management scheme. However, at the last minute, it was decided 
that quota holders should not acquire more quotas than they could catch with their own (or 
leased) vessels nor could each of them acquire more than ten per cent of the TAC. This 
maximum TAC share rule was an idea put forward by economists from the UCFE, who 
claimed that competition was better for the economy than monopoly. Of course, this idea had 
been known in the field of economics since the days of Adam Smith, but here, it was proudly 
presented by them in an article in the reputable Global Review of Fisheries Economics. No 
one understood why the economists concluded with a ten per cent maximum TAC share 
instead of, say, eight or twelve, but most were happy with the conclusion. 
                                                 
1 Vessel owners seem to be attracted by ITQ arrangements when they get the quotas for free and not through a 
public auction or purchased from the Government. For this reason, the system could have been called IFQ – 
individual free quotas, since it is the F they really seem to prefer. 
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ITQ efficiency and crew remuneration 
 
The ITQ system effectively reduced the vessel capacity, especially in the small fishing 
villages, where the small scale vessels neither got ITQs for free nor had the capital to buy 
quotas. However, some people with low opportunity cost of vessel capital and family labour 
were able to lease annual quotas for some time. Fishermen that were out of work did their best 
to find jobs elsewhere, but few of them succeeded. If they were successful, some of them 
found that their earnings were not as good as those they had enjoyed while fishing. Other 
commercial and public services in the fishing villages were also negatively affected and 
property values fell. With an increase in unemployment, average earnings stagnated and even 
reduced, in real terms. This also affected the earnings of the crew members, who, according to 
custom, were paid a share of the gross or net value of the catch. Increased average catch per 
vessel, through quota purchases and increased catch per unit of effort (CPUE), due to higher 
stock level, increased the earnings for crew members. However, the UVO did not think this 
was fair as long as there were an increasing number of surplus workers who wanted to join 
their fishing crews. After some fishing-fleet labour disputes, which for weeks had kept vessels 
idle at shore, the UVO took their case to the Government Committee for Labour Dispute 
Settlement. This Committee, comprising leading economists who understood the meaning of 
the word opportunity cost of labour, found the arguments of the UVO persuasive and ruled for 
lower percentage shares to crew members to meet the needs of the national economy and the 
labour market. Thus, after a transitional gain2 for crew members from the ITQ system, their 
percentage shares, and thereby the annual incomes, were reduced to become comparable with 
that of other semi-skilled workers in Codland. The ruling that costs of leasing quotas should 
be deducted from vessel gross revenue before the calculation of the crew’s income 




Some of the initial quota holders, and a few entrepreneurial-minded newcomers, grew richer 
and richer through their initial, free quota allocation from the Government and from wise 
                                                 
2 The concept of the Transitional Gains Trap originates from Tullock, 1975 and has been discussed in the 
fisheries economics literature, including in Flaaten et al., 1995. 
3 This in contrast to the Republic of Iceland where the politically strong Fishermen’s Union has managed to keep 
the quota lease as a vessel owner cost, not to be shared by the crew members (Matthiasson, 2009b). 
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investments in quotas and vessels. The latter was important, especially in the early phase of 
the new management before everyone understood the real, long term value of fish quotas. 
Also, the remaining few skipper owners did well, as fish stocks recovered and they could take 
advantage of reduced labour costs. Traditionally, under the open-access regime, skipper 
owners tended not to be much wealthier than experienced crew members, since the latter had 
the opportunity of investing in their own boats if they were not content with the work and 
remuneration conditions. Since quota and vessel ownership were historically confined to 
Codlander nationals, they avoided foreign competition on the Stock Exchange. The wealth 
that was created was partly invested and partly spent on conspicuous consumption, mainly 
abroad. The biggest quota holders had a clear preference for investment and living in the City 
of Europe, where the economy and the stock exchange were booming and lavish consumption 
was not so easily observed by their fellow countrymen, at home in Codland.  
 
Economy of scale existed to some extent in fish harvesting, at least in the offshore trawler 
fleet, but even more so in quota management. For this reason, the biggest quota holders 
believed it would be to their advantage to abolish the maximum TAC share rule. The 
economists at the University College of Fisheries Economics supported them, since they had 
recently investigated and proved the existence of economy of scale in quota holding and trade, 
and had presented their findings at an international fisheries economics conference. The 
biggest quota holders presented their approach to the Codland Parliament, which demanded a 
change in the Fisheries Law in order to remove the ten percent maximum share TAC rule. It 
was easy to convince the general public of this argument – at least, there was hardly any 
opposition in the media, probably because two of the richest quota holders had invested in the 
biggest newspaper and in the only commercial television station in Codland. The Parliament 
was in favour of wealth creation and the majority voted to abolish the ten percent maximum 
TAC share rule and the formal bindings between quotas and vessel ownership. Thus Codland 
now got the most modern Fisheries Law among the industrialised countries and its fishing 
industry, including the financial branch, was ready to reap the benefits. The greatest optimists 
expected the benefits to exceed even those of the North Atlantic fishing nation, Iceland, which 
had performed so well with its ITQ system (Arnason, 2008). The reader should know, 
however, that Iceland has not yet abolished the maximum rule even if it has been discussed 
from time to time (Matthiasson, 2009b) and that its cod stock declined by 24% from 1978 to 
2003 (Eggert, 2009). 
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The following year, the fisheries-based financial sector had the highest growth rate ever 
experienced for any industry in Codland. Quotas were traded on the Stock Exchange and 
could only be traded by wealthy banks that could meet the demand for credit from those who 
wanted to buy and lease quotas for fishing. In addition to the proper quota market, where a 
vessel owner could buy a quota to meet the expected catch in the coming year, more 
sophisticated financial instruments were developed. Future markets for quotas and fish 
developed. Skipper owners and fishermen were encouraged by the financial institutions to 
participate in this part of the economy and encouraged to participate in other trades, not only 
in fishing – and many did. Surplus capital and earnings were invested in the financial sector, 
such as in shares and bonds, as well as in more sophisticated future debt obligations. ITQs 
were used as guaranty for loans and mortgaged. The financial consultants argued that the 
latter should transfer risk from the present to the future; but how this worked was difficult to 
comprehend for ordinary people. Even though fishermen were traditionally considered risk-
neutral or even risk loving, their prudent attitude told them to be careful about what the future 
might bring for the fish stock, quota prices, market prices of fish, fuel prices and exchange 
rates. Thus the markets for risk-reducing financial instruments continued to grow and this 




Nature often varies in richness across time; for some years the TACs had to be reduced 
significantly due the decline in the growth of the fish stock. At the same time, there was an 
international financial crisis coupled with an economic recession, with a reduction in the 
demand and price of fish. This setback created great problems for those skipper owners who, 
encouraged by the then-wealthy banks, had borrowed money to buy vessel licenses and ITQs.  
Most skippers had attended two-day courses in corporate finance, organised by their banks 
and they had learned about the present value of ITQs and capital, in general. They clearly 
remembered that the present value of an annual, constant profit of 100 Euros for infinity 
amounted to 100 divided by the interest rate. Thus, 100 Euros per year was really worth as 
much as 2000 Euros now, if the interest rate stayed at five per cent per year. In previous years, 
with high fish prices, low interest rates and banks almost pushing loans on companies, skipper 
owners and fishermen, like many other Codlanders, had borrowed heavily for both investment 
and consumption. Like in the neighbouring country of Iceland the quota holders had invested 
and consumed from credits using the quotas as collateral (see e.g. Matthiasson, 2009). 
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So there was a backlash. It started with a modest decline in the world market fish price. The 
fish quota price on the CSE fell dramatically, inflicting problems on ITQ holders, in particular 
on those that had borrowed heavily and mortgaged their quota holdings and houses for up to 
100 per cent. The lending banks demanded foreclosures of both fish quotas and houses 
belonging to skippers and fishermen and soon this spread to other home-owners and small 
businesses. With the reduction in quota holdings, most of the remaining skipper owners had to 
try and sell their fishing boats. Soon the economic crisis spread throughout the Codland 
economy, resulting in a dramatic increase in unemployment. However, hardly anyone 
understood what was going on4. Some people emigrated to countries that had not been badly 
hit by the general economic downturn. Others wanted to leave, but found it difficult because 
they owned mortgaged houses, which they would have to sell at a huge loss. Unemployment 
rose despite the emigration, resulting in a downward pressure on wages and other earnings. 
 
Sea Lords Ltd. 
 
The fishing industry was almost transformed into a monopoly with a holding company for 
ITQs called Sea Lords Ltd. And, through the purchase of quotas, many small- and medium-
sized holders were forced to sell.  The three men owning the vast majority of this valuable 
company grew richer and richer and they still anticipated further growth. The only remaining 
restriction on quota ownership was that ITQ-holders had to be Codland citizens. It should be 
noted that the previous two restrictive rules, the limit on quota holdings related to vessel 
capacity and the ten percent maximum TAC share rule, had both been abolished to promote 
productivity and growth in the fishing industry. Sea Lords Ltd. fulfilled the citizenship 
requirement, since foreigners could hold a maximum of twenty per cent of the company 
shares5. This was according to the company’s own bylaws, introduced to demonstrate to the 
Government and the people of Codland that they clearly complied with paragraph ten of the 
Constitution, “The fish resources within the country’s EEZ belong to the people of Codland in 
common”.  
 
                                                 
4 One of the exceptions was a part-time fisherman who was also a teacher in the local language, Codlandic. He 
had read The Grapes of Wrath by John Steinbeck (published by Viking Press Inc. in 1939) and could see some 
parallels between the recent developments in the fishing industry in Codland and the US farming industry during 
the Great Depression in the 1930s.  
5 This was inspired by the New Zealand Fisheries Act 1996 that allowed maximum 25 % foreign ownership – 
though with some exceptions if the foreigners could contribute to the national economy (Wallis, 2009). 
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The three men, who owned 90 per cent of Sea Lords Ltd., also strengthened their business 
interests in other companies and showed a particular interest in the media industry. They 
considered it of great importance that Codland had newspapers and television stations, which 
promoted free business and markets. In the main, they preferred to diversify their investments 
to other markets, in particular via their subsidiary companies in the City of Europe. This, of 
course, required that they mainly lived in this metropole and only visited Codland for 
necessary meetings. Their families enjoyed this lifestyle, since the living conditions in the 
City of Europe were now much better than in Codland where the market and fisheries crises 
had hit people hard. Nevertheless, modern technology allowed regular contact with their 
homeland. Everyday, on the Internet, they could read in the Star News, gossip about old 
friends and neighbours. The entertainment value of this newspaper had improved significantly 
after the change of editor the previous year, a change, which the owner of Sea Lords Ltd. had 
deemed necessary to meet business needs.  
 
Holding nearly 96 per cent of the permanent ITQs, the Sea Lords Ltd. Chief Executive Officer 
and Board of Governors were fully aware of their responsibility for the Codland fishing 
industry. One of the most profitable parts of their business – the leasing of ITQs to fish 
harvesters – could be accomplished easily through the Internet and other modern 
communication systems. For this purpose, they had established a subsidiary company, Fair 
Trade Ltd., which mainly leased annual ITQs to vessel companies, skipper owners and small 
scale fishermen who, at that time, owned very few permanent quotas. Some processing 
companies also leased quotas, which they used on a share basis for their own vessels and were 
operated by fishermen who could not afford to buy their own boats. These were the poorest of 
fishermen, but a few young men dreamed about buying their own boats and, to this end, were 
willing to take risks and work hard. The trio of lords (as the three company owners once were 
called by the previous editor of Star News) agreed that they should not sell any permanent 
quotas unless they needed liquidity for other, better investments6. Thus, through Fair Trade 
Ltd., all quotas, owned by Sea Lords Ltd., were offered to the market and the competition for 
leasing among harvesters was fierce. Since very few people had the opportunity to go fishing 
without leasing ITQs from Sea Lords Ltd., this company had a monopoly to collect nearly all 
resource rents, including some intra-marginal rent from the highliners.  
 
                                                 
6 This way the permanent ITQs acted as a Sarephta’s pot (see The Bible, 1 King, 17: 8-14, e.g. at 
http://www.newadvent.org/bible/1ki017.htm#vrs8 ).  
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Even though the total rent, in profitable years, amounted to nearly 50 per cent of the first hand 
market value of fish, the annual accounts of Sea Lords Ltd. did not reveal this. The owners 
did not like boasting of their wealth, so the net gain from the ITQ leasing business was, in 
reality, transferred to other companies within the lordship group. In addition, operating the 
private jet, Dassault Falcon lux900 Spirit, and owning company mansions just outside the 
City of Europe (as well as in France and Spain, on the Côte d’Azur and the Costa del Sol, 
respectively) were not enjoyed for free. All of these capital items were considered crucial to 
the business of Sea Lords Ltd. by the trio of lords themselves and they had established 
subsidiary companies that each owned one of these capital items. The deposed editor, who 
had been fired from Star News, had not quite understood the business needs of a Codland 
company in a globalised world when he had printed some pictures from these company 
facilities and called them “perks”. However, the present editor, as well as editors of other 
newspapers and television stations affiliated to Sea Lords Ltd., had a much better 




Several countries have introduced some kind of rights management rules for their fisheries, be 
they ITQs or vessel licenses, and these rights are more or less transferable (see e.g. OECD, 
2006). However, to the best of this author’s knowledge, no country has made them fully 
transferable and divisible, and no-one has fully untied harvest quotas from vessel capacity, 
with no restriction on ownership. This is an indication of the existence of sound preferences 
that include both resource rent and its distribution, partly to avoid rent drain. The discussion 
above has focused on what might happen if restrictions, aimed at targeting rent distribution, 
are gradually removed. The probability that this would happen in any society depends on 
general economic and social conditions in the society, including on the empowerment 
distribution among citizens and social classes. The focus of this paper has been on a fisheries-
dependent country, where the country’s Parliament makes the laws. However, in the case of 
fisheries-dependent regions in bigger countries, the likelihood of rent drain from these regions 
into central areas, is probably even more likely than in Codland.  
 
Is not the creation of resource rent in the fisheries of Codland, described above, a Pareto 
improvement? No, it is not. The Pareto improvement criterion asks for the reallocation of 
productive resources, which makes at least one person better off, while making no-one worse 
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off. In Codland, a few gained a lot, but many lost income and wealth, so it is not a Pareto 
improvement. However, this is clearly a Kaldor-Hicks improvement. The following test was 
suggested in 1939 in The Economic Journal. State A is preferred to state B if those who gain 
from the former could compensate those who loose and can still be better off. This 
compensation is hypothetical and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion tells us that A is preferable to B 
even if compensation does not really take place. But why would any of the likely losers agree 
on such a policy if they are not actually compensated? The answer is – they probably do not 
agree. However, in a democracy, the majority rules and it all boils down to who can persuade 
the majority vote, the likely winners or the likely losers of fisheries reforms? Free initial 
fishing rights may be very valuable and strengthen the bargaining power of the recipients, at 
the expense of other fisheries businesses. The seeds of the company, Sea Lords Ltd., may 
even be wasted on direct, unproductive rent-seeking activities. Thus, from an equity and from 
an efficiency point of view, the fisheries’ windfall gains should not be allocated to just a few 
citizens for free. Rather, we should look into the possibility of distributing the gains more 
widely among people and across generations. For this purpose, other instruments, such as 
conditional tradable fish quotas and vessel licenses, resource taxes, co-management, public 
ownership, auctions, leases, time limited rights, time and area regulations, territorial user 
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